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Abstract
This study investigates whether market participants perceive pro forma earnings to be more
informative and more persistent than GAAP operating income by analyzing a sample of 1,149
actual pro forma press releases. We ﬁnd that pro forma announcers report frequent GAAP
losses and are mostly concentrated in the service and high-tech industries. Our analyses of
short-window abnormal returns and revisions in analysts’ one-quarter-ahead earnings
forecasts indicate that pro forma earnings are more informative and more permanent than
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GAAP operating earnings. Our evidence suggests that market participants believe pro forma
earnings are more representative of ‘‘core earnings’’ than GAAP operating income.
r 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In response to the recent debate about the proliferation of ‘‘pro forma’’ earnings
reports, this study investigates the relative informativeness and permanence of pro
forma earnings compared to earnings calculated according to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). Pro forma earnings, often called ‘‘street’’ earnings in
the ﬁnancial press, are GAAP earnings adjusted for items that management deems to
be ‘‘unusual’’ or ‘‘non-recurring.’’ Increasingly, companies are reporting this non-
standard proﬁtability measure in the same press release with their standard GAAP
earnings ﬁgure (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002).
Critics allege that pro forma earnings are ad hoc, self-serving to managers, and
misleading to investors (e.g., Derby, 2001; Dreman, 2001; Elstein, 2001; Liesman and
Weil, 2001a, b). They also argue that pro forma numbers are not comparable across
ﬁrms or even for the same ﬁrm over time (Grant and Parker, 2001). The former chief
accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Lynn Turner,
suggests that pro forma earnings are reported by some companies to deliberately
‘‘spin investors’’ by reporting ‘‘everything but bad stuff’’ (Dow Jones, 2001a).
Recently, the SEC has issued cautionary advice about pro forma earnings: ‘‘We
believe it is appropriate toycaution public companies on their use of ‘pro forma’
ﬁnancial information and to alert investors to potential dangers of such
information’’ (SEC 2001a, b). Furthermore, the SEC has warned that ‘‘‘Pro forma’
ﬁnancialsymight create a confusing or misleading impression and should be viewed
with appropriate and healthy skepticism’’ (SEC, 2001c). The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB, 2002) has also expressed concern that the proliferation of
pro forma earnings information is undermining the quality of ﬁnancial reporting
(FASB, 2002).
Managers, on the other hand, contend that they report pro forma earnings to
provide a clearer picture of ‘‘core earnings’’ that they believe will continue in future
periods (Weil, 2001a). Supporters of this view argue that removing transitory and
non-cash components (such as unusual items, one-time charges, and gains) from
earnings reduces noise in the earnings measure (Bray, 2001). Surprisingly, even the
former SEC chairman, Harvey Pitt, has suggested that the impetus behind pro forma
disclosure is often ‘‘a legitimate desire by companies to demystify mandated ﬁnancial
statement disclosures’’. He goes on to say that ‘‘investors anxious for current,
simpliﬁed and comprehensible ﬁnancial reporting are today more likely to rely on a
company’s ‘pro forma’ disclosures than the same company’s meticulously prepared,
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mandated GAAP ﬁnancial disclosures’’ (Pitt, 2001). Given this debate about the
usefulness and impact of pro forma information, empirical evidence regarding the
market’s perception of pro forma earnings is particularly timely and relevant. In this
study, we analyze a sample of 1,149 actual pro forma earnings press releases
gathered from LexisNexis from January 1998 through December 2000 to assess the
relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings vis-"a-vis GAAP
operating earnings.
Most prior studies exploring market reactions to ‘‘street’’ earnings have used
earnings per share (EPS) ﬁgures reported by analyst estimate tracking services (e.g.,
I/B/E/S, First Call, Zacks) as proxies for pro forma earnings (e.g., Abarbanell and
Lehavy, 2000; Bagnoli et al., 2001; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bradshaw and
Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003). Although these studies provide valuable evidence
regarding investors’ perceptions of non-GAAP earnings ﬁgures reported by major
forecast tracking services, the extent to which the actual earnings ﬁgures reported by
these forecast data providers approximate pro forma earnings numbers managers
report in press releases is an open question. This is especially relevant since we
estimate (as explained in detail in Section 3) that the majority of ﬁrms that are
covered by these forecast tracking services do not report pro forma numbers.
Further, these studies do not provide any information on (1) the characteristics of
ﬁrms that elect to voluntarily report pro forma earnings, (2) the industries where pro
forma announcements are concentrated, and (3) the types of adjustments and
exclusions companies frequently use to arrive at their pro forma numbers. Such
information is valuable in understanding the motivations behind pro forma
reporting. Consequently, we analyze a large sample of actual pro forma press
releases to assess the relative informativeness and persistence of pro forma earnings
vis-"a-vis GAAP operating earnings and actual EPS ﬁgures published by I/B/E/S.1
We also provide various descriptive details on common types of pro forma
adjustments and on the characteristics of ﬁrms that report pro forma earnings.
Our analyses reveal that ﬁrms reporting pro forma earnings ﬁgures tend to be
from service and high-tech industries, and that routine expenses, which should be
included in operating income under GAAP, are the most common types of pro
forma adjustments (resulting in higher income ﬁgures). We ﬁnd that pro forma
numbers may not be comparable across ﬁrms because ﬁrms use numerous different
adjustments to arrive at their pro forma earnings ﬁgures. Matched-pair t-tests reveal
that pro forma earnings numbers are signiﬁcantly greater than both GAAP and
I/B/E/S earnings ﬁgures. We also ﬁnd that pro forma numbers result in a proﬁt more
often than (audited) GAAP operating income ﬁgures. Finally, our results indicate
that most pro forma announcements (80.1%) meet or beat analysts’ mean forecasts,
while only 38.7% of the GAAP operating earnings ﬁgures meet or beat analysts’
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1Two recent working papers (Lougee and Marquardt, 2002; Johnson and Schwartz, 2001) also examine
actual pro forma announcements collected from press releases. We compare and contrast our results with
these two studies later in the paper. In addition, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) demonstrate analytically that
pro forma disclosures bias investors’ perceptions upward, yet can make stock prices more accurately reﬂect
fundamental value.
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mean forecasts. This evidence is consistent with the criticism leveled by many
skeptics that pro forma announcements may often be motivated by managers’
desires to meet or beat analysts’ expectations.
Our investigation of short-window abnormal returns around earnings announce-
ment dates reveals that pro forma earnings are signiﬁcantly more informative to
investors than GAAP operating earnings. Consistent with prior research (e.g.,
Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002), the results also indicate
that I/B/E/S EPS ﬁgures are also more informative than GAAP operating earnings.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that analysts view pro forma earnings to be a more
permanent measure of ﬁrm proﬁtability than GAAP operating earnings. Again, our
evidence suggests that operating earnings reported by I/B/E/S are also more
persistent than GAAP operating income. In sum, our results indicate that market
participants view pro forma earnings to be more representative of ‘‘core earnings’’
than GAAP operating earnings. Prior research arrives at a similar conclusion
regarding investors’ perceptions of non-GAAP earnings reported by forecast data
providers. These studies ﬁnd that EPS values published by forecast data providers
have greater information content than GAAP earnings (e.g., Brown and Sivakumar,
2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Additional analysis reveals that investors ﬁnd pro
forma announcements to be less informative when they meet analysts’ expectations
while the corresponding GAAP operating earnings ﬁgures fall below analysts’
expectations. Investors, however, do not discount pro forma announcements that
report a proﬁt while the corresponding GAAP operating earnings number reports a
loss. Analysts, on the other hand, appear to be more skeptical of (and attach less
weight to) these types of announcements, as well as those where managers
manipulate the number of shares used in the EPS calculation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
overview of pro forma reporting, reviews relevant literature, and develops our
research questions. Section 3 describes our sample and discusses various descriptive
details. Section 4 compares market reactions to pro forma earnings with market
reactions to GAAP and I/B/E/S EPS ﬁgures. Section 5 describes additional factors
inﬂuencing the informativeness and permanence of pro forma numbers. Finally,
Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. Background and research questions
The debate about the usefulness and likely effects of pro forma earnings reports
has become intense in recent months. Managers generally claim that they arrive at
the pro forma number by excluding transitory and non-cash items from GAAP
earnings. They therefore claim that the pro forma ﬁgure represents an improved
metric for assessing future cash ﬂows and ﬁrm value (e.g., Bray, 2001; Weil, 2001a).
Even former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt has commented that the proliferation of
pro forma earnings is evidence of inadequacy in our current ﬁnancial reporting
system. He said, ‘‘The recent phenomenon of ‘pro forma’ ﬁnancials is indicative of
the need to rethink our current system’’ (Pitt, 2001).
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In contrast, standard setters, regulators, and other critics of pro forma reporting
are concerned that the alleged incomplete and selective information conveyed by pro
forma earnings reports is likely to be misleading to investors (e.g., Rapoport, 2001;
SEC, 2001b; Weil, 2001b). These critics allege that managers selectively exclude items
from GAAP earnings to arrive at the pro forma number in order to portray the
company in the best light possible (Weil, 2001a). For example, JDS Uniphase, a
maker of ﬁber optics equipment, turned a $50.6 billion GAAP loss into a $67 million
pro forma proﬁt, but hid the adjustment details deep inside the press release that
began by highlighting the company’s increased sales (Dow Jones, 2001b). Similarly,
Waste Management Inc. went from missing analysts’ expectations by two cents per
share based on GAAP numbers to beating analysts’ expectations by a penny on a
pro forma basis through the exclusion of costs associated with the painting of trucks
(Elstein, 2001). Thus, critics of pro forma reporting caution investors to be wary of
pro forma numbers disclosed in press releases and urge investors to focus on audited
GAAP earnings instead (Dreman, 2001). Some academics also share this concern.
D’Avolio et al. (2001) argue that even though GAAP numbers may not always
provide economically superior information, failure to follow accounting standards is
likely to lead to inefﬁcient overall outcomes as the ability of regulators to enforce
disclosure standards deteriorates. Moreover, Grant and Parker (2001) contend that
many ﬁrms make different adjustments to arrive at pro forma earnings each time
they report on a pro forma basis, reducing the comparability of their earnings ﬁgures
from one period to the next. Academic research, however, is yet to provide
conclusive empirical evidence to support or refute the claims of either camp.
Several recent studies attempt to examine market reactions to pro forma earnings
vis-"a-vis GAAP earnings. These studies use actual EPS ﬁgures published by major
analyst tracking services as proxies for pro forma or ‘‘street’’ earnings. For example,
Brown and Sivakumar (2003) assess the quality of three earnings measures: (1)
Compustat quarterly EPS before extraordinary items, (2) Compustat quarterly EPS
from operations, and (3) the actual EPS ﬁgure published by I/B/E/S, which they
label as ‘‘street’’ earnings. They ﬁnd that I/B/E/S actual EPS ﬁgures are of higher
quality than the other two measures in terms of predictive ability, value relevance,
and information content. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) also ﬁnd that the market’s
response is more closely associated with I/B/E/S actual earnings than with
Compustat earnings before extraordinary items. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) ﬁnd
that although earnings surprises based on earnings ﬁgures reported by major forecast
data providers (namely First Call, Zacks, and I/B/E/S) are more highly associated
with contemporaneous stock returns than earnings surprises based on Compustat
operating earnings, the result is attributable to a small subset of ﬁrms where analysts
exclude (from both forecasts and actual earnings) extreme income-decreasing special
items that are otherwise included in GAAP operating income. Finally, Bagnoli et al.
(2001) explore cross-sectional variations in the market’s response to pro forma
earnings, while Doyle et al. (2003) examine the relation between future cash ﬂows
and expenses excluded from pro forma earnings, again using the earnings reported
by forecast data providers as proxies for pro forma numbers. Collectively, these
studies suggest that (1) there is a growing divergence between pro forma and GAAP
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earnings numbers and (2) pro forma earnings ﬁgures are generally more highly
associated with abnormal stock returns than GAAP operating income. However, as
mentioned previously, it is difﬁcult to assess to what extent the results reported by
these prior studies apply to actual pro forma numbers reported by managers.
We contend that this study extends prior research in three important ways. First,
only a small subset of ﬁrms covered by major forecast tracking services actually
report pro forma earnings numbers.2 Further, we ﬁnd that even for the small subset
of all ﬁrms covered by I/B/E/S that report pro forma numbers, there is a signiﬁcant
difference, on average, between pro forma earnings and actual EPS ﬁgures provided
by I/B/E/S. This underscores the importance of examining actual pro forma press
releases to assess investors’ perceptions of these disclosures. Second, studies using
actual EPS ﬁgures reported by forecast data providers are unable to capture the
unique characteristics of ﬁrms that voluntarily elect to report pro forma numbers.
For example, we ﬁnd (as explained in detail in Section 3) that the companies that
report pro forma earnings tend to be high-tech ﬁrms that frequently report GAAP
losses. Third, examining actual pro forma earnings enables us to provide
information on the types and nature of adjustments and exclusions commonly used
by companies to arrive at the pro forma ﬁgures. Such information provides valuable
insights into our understanding of the motivations and incentives associated with pro
forma reporting.
We analyze a sample of 1,149 actual pro forma earnings press releases issued
between January 1998 and December 2000 to assess how the market perceives pro
forma numbers vis-"a-vis GAAP operating earnings and actual EPS ﬁgures published
by I/B/E/S. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the following three research questions:
(1) How do pro forma earnings numbers differ from GAAP operating earnings and
I/B/E/S actual EPS ﬁgures?
(2) Do market participants perceive pro forma earnings to be more informative than
GAAP operating earnings or I/B/E/S actual EPS ﬁgures?
(3) Do market participants view pro forma earnings to be a more permanent
measure of ﬁrm proﬁtability than GAAP operating earnings or I/B/E/S actual
EPS ﬁgures?
In addition, we provide descriptive evidence regarding the characteristics of ﬁrms
that report pro forma earnings, the industries where pro forma announcements are
concentrated, and the types of adjustments and exclusions that appear frequently in
the pro forma press releases.
Two recent working papers also analyze actual pro forma press releases. Lougee
and Marquardt (2002) examine a sample of 249 pro forma press releases made
between 1997 and 1999. Johnson et al. (2001) employ a market-multiples approach
to investigate whether there is evidence of stock return premiums around pro forma
announcement dates using a sample of 253 pro forma press releases during the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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actually report pro forma (or non-GAAP) earnings ﬁgures.
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second quarter (June–August) of 2000.3 While the Lougee and Marquardt paper
reaches a conclusion similar to our study, the Johnson and Schwartz paper ﬁnds that
investors do not perceive pro forma earnings to be informative. We compare and
contrast our results with those reported in the Johnson and Schwartz study in
Section 4.
3. Sample selection and descriptive evidence
3.1. Sample selection
We collected our sample of pro forma press releases from LexisNexis—
speciﬁcally, the PR Newswire and Business Wire—for the years 1998–2000. We
examine all pro forma announcements in which the company discloses a pro forma
diluted EPS ﬁgure that differs from disclosed GAAP diluted EPS. Our initial search
(using the keywords ‘‘pro forma’’, ‘‘pro-forma’’, and ‘‘proforma’’) retrieved 6,471
press releases.4 However, after analyzing each press release, we ﬁnd that only 1,808
announcements contain actual quarterly pro forma earnings announcements for
companies listed on major US stock exchanges. The other 4,663 press releases from
the initial search refer to such things as current period pro forma revenues, forward-
looking pro forma forecasts, earnings after adding in results from ﬁrms acquired or
merged in the current period, or statements referring to prior period pro forma
earnings. Finally, we require that ﬁrm-quarter observations have data available in
Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S. This yields a ﬁnal sample of 1,149 quarterly pro
forma press releases between January 1998 and December 2000, with full data
available on these three databases.
Some companies use nomenclatures other than ‘‘pro forma’’, ‘‘pro-forma’’, or
‘‘proforma’’ to describe their non-GAAP earnings metrics. In order to estimate what
proportion of non-GAAP earnings press releases our search string captures, we
perform a detailed examination of other non-GAAP nomenclatures used in press
releases from June through August 2000.5 Wallace (2002) performs a detailed
categorization of non-GAAP earnings nomenclatures used by companies during her
sample period. Based on Wallace’s (2002) list of non-GAAP earnings nomenclatures,
we search LexisNexis using the following search string: ‘‘earnings excluding, net
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3While they examine 433 pro forma press releases for generating descriptive statistics, it appears that
their examination of the informativeness of pro forma earnings to investors is limited to 253 observations
(according to the December 2001 version of their working paper).
4D’Avolio et al. (2001) perform a similar search and ﬁnd 2,384 hits on the PR Newswire for these years.
The fact that we have more hits could be attributable to the search string we use and/or to the fact that we
search both the PR Newswire and the Business Wire.
5The reason we examine this time period is because it coincides with the Johnson and Schwartz (2001)
sample period (and benchmarks their sample with ours and with all available non-GAAP announcements
available on the PR Newswire and Business Wire). In addition, the frequency of pro forma reporting is
much higher in 2000 than in 1998 and 1999. Thus, the estimate we obtain during this time period is likely
to be closer to the upper bound of all non-GAAP nomenclatures used by companies in any quarter during
our sample period.
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income excluding, adjusted net income, adjusted loss, cash earnings, earnings before,
free cash ﬂow, normalized EPS, normalized earnings, recurring earnings, distribu-
table cash ﬂow, GAAP one-time adjusted, GAAP adjusted, Cash loss, AND NOT
pro forma, pro-forma, or proforma’’. Note that we do not include EBITDA since
this was a commonly reported ﬁgure long before the pro forma reporting trend
began in the mid-1990s. We ﬁnd that while our original search string and subsequent
data screens result in 189 pro forma earnings announcements during the June–
August 2000 sub-period, this new search string identiﬁes an additional 193 (bringing
the total to 382) non-GAAP earnings press releases reported on a per-share basis and
meeting all data requirements. Thus, our search string captures about half of all non-
GAAP EPS numbers released by companies during this period. Based on this
broader search string, we estimate that only a small proportion of public companies
covered by I/B/E/S (about 10.7%)6 reports any form of pro forma or non-GAAP
EPS ﬁgure.
3.2. Classification of pro forma adjustments and characteristics and evolution of pro
forma announcements
We begin our analysis by classifying each pro forma adjustment disclosed in a
press release into one of the following nine categories (a single press release often
contains more than one adjustment category): (1) depreciation and amortization
costs (DEPRAMORT), (2) stock based compensation costs (STOCKCOMP), (3)
merger and acquisition costs (MERGE), (4) acquired in-process research and
development costs written-off (R&D), (5) gains or losses on asset dispositions
(GAINLOSS), (6) ‘‘below the line’’ items (EXTRADISC),7 (7) adjustments to the
number of shares outstanding used in the denominator of the EPS calculation
(SHARES), (8) other speciﬁc adjustments (OTHER), and (9) no adjustment details
given in the press release (NOADJUST). We provide descriptive evidence on the
broad characteristics of ﬁrms that make pro forma announcements, the types of
adjustments companies frequently make to arrive at the pro forma number, and how
pro forma reporting has evolved over the three years of our sample period.
Panel A of Table 1 classiﬁes our ﬁnal sample of 1,149 pro forma press releases by
the one-digit SIC industry code of the announcing ﬁrms. Panel A reports that about
50% of these announcements are made by ﬁrms in the service industries (SIC codes
7000–8999), while approximately 31% of the pro forma announcements are made by
ﬁrms in the manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000–3999). The proportion of our
sample ﬁrms classiﬁed in service industries is extremely high relative to the
percentage of service companies in the universe of Compustat ﬁrms (only about 20%
of Compustat ﬁrms are classiﬁed in these industries). However, the percentage of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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June–August 2000 period. Thus, the proportion of ﬁrms with complete data that announce non-GAAP
EPS ﬁgures is only 10.7% (382/3,556) of the I/B/E/S population.
7 ‘‘Below the line’’ items include extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and the cumulative effect
of changes in accounting principles.
N. Bhattacharya et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 36 (2003) 285–319292
sample ﬁrms in manufacturing industries is similar to the proportion in the
Compustat population (about 38%). Further analysis (not tabulated) reveals that
based on the classiﬁcation scheme used by I/B/E/S, 44% of our sample ﬁrms are
categorized in high-tech industries compared to only 19% of companies in the
I/B/E/S population.8 Thus, this evidence indicates that pro forma announcers are
heavily concentrated in the service and high-tech industries.
Many of these press releases include multiple adjustments from GAAP to arrive at
pro forma earnings. Therefore, Panel B of Table 1 classiﬁes a total of 1,956
adjustments from 1,149 pro forma press releases.9 Panel B shows that depreciation
and amortization and stock compensation costs are the two most common types of
pro forma adjustments (21% and 17%, respectively). We also ﬁnd that a large
proportion of pro forma adjustments simply change the number of shares used in the
denominator of the EPS calculation (16%). We ﬁnd that managers manipulate the
number of shares outstanding in the denominator of the pro forma EPS calculation
to decrease the magnitude of a GAAP loss per share.10
Panel B of Table 1 also illustrates that pro forma reporting has increased
signiﬁcantly over our three-year sample period. The number of pro forma press
releases has increased from 181 in 1998 to 695 in 2000. Similarly, the number of
adjustments in these press releases increased from 273 in 1998 to 1,373 in 2000. This
panel also reveals that certain types of adjustments or exclusions have become more
common over time, while others have become less frequent over our sample period.
For example, the exclusion of depreciation and amortization accounted for only 4%
of total adjustments made in 1998 but increased to 26% of adjustments made in
2000. Similarly, the exclusion of stock-based compensation costs increased from 3%
in 1998 to 22% in 2000. Conversely, ﬁrms simply adjusting the number of shares
used in the denominator of the EPS calculation decreased from 37% in 1998 to 11%
in 2000.
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8 I/B/E/S classiﬁes Sector/Industry/Group (SIG) codes 080101–089901 as ‘‘technology’’ industries. We
also include SIG codes 110301–110303 (telecommunications) in our ‘‘high-tech’’ classiﬁcation.
9We ﬁnd that in approximately 10% of our pro forma announcements companies make no disclosure
about speciﬁc adjustments they use to arrive at the pro forma number. The SEC has expressed particular
concern about such announcements since they may be misleading to investors (SEC, 2001b).
10Managers manipulate the number of shares outstanding in their pro forma EPS calculation to
decrease a GAAP loss per share in two ways. First, SFAS 128 requires that companies include convertible
securities in the diluted EPS calculation only if they have the effect of diluting the EPS ﬁgure (i.e.,
decreasing income per share or increasing loss per share). Otherwise, they are classiﬁed as antidilutive
securities and should be excluded from the EPS calculation. We ﬁnd that managers with negative GAAP
EPS numbers manipulate pro forma EPS by including antidilutive convertible securities in the
denominator of the loss per share calculation. Second, SFAS 128 speciﬁes that if a security has been
outstanding all year, it should be included in the weighted average number of shares outstanding as if it
had been converted at the beginning of the year. However, if securities are issued during the year, they
should only be included in the weighted average number of shares outstanding calculation based on the
proportion of the year outstanding. Managers sometimes manipulate the pro forma EPS denominator by
including convertible securities issued during the year in the weighted number of shares outstanding as if
they had been converted at the beginning of the year. In either case, managers increase the number of
shares outstanding used in the denominator of the EPS calculation in order to decrease the magnitude of a
GAAP loss per share on a pro forma basis.
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Table 1
Classiﬁcation of 1,149 pro forma announcements by adjustment category and industry of 596 ﬁrms during the 1998–2000 period
Panel A: Classiﬁcation of pro forma press releases by industry
SIC Code
Total 0–1999 2000–2999 3000–3999 4000–4999 5000–5999 6000–6999 7000–7999 8000–8999
Frequency 1,149 22 76 277 63 93 44 508 66
Percentage (%) 100 1.9 6.6 24.1 5.5 8.1 3.8 44.2 5.7
Panel B: Classiﬁcation of pro forma adjustments by yeara
Adjustment category 1998 1999 2000 1998–2000 Totals
Frequency Percent
(%)
Frequency Percent
(%)
Frequency Percent
(%)
Frequency Percent
(%)
DEPARTMENT 11 4 39 13 360 26 410 21
STOCKCOMP 8 3 28 9 306 22 342 17
MERGE 46 17 53 17 103 8 202 10
R&D 21 8 18 6 118 9 157 8
GAINLOSS 4 1 10 3 57 4 71 4
EXTRADISC 11 4 14 5 35 3 60 3
SHARES 101 37 58 19 155 11 314 16
OTHER 71 26 90 29 239 17 400 20
Total adjustmentsb 273 100 310 100 1,373 100 1,956 100
Total press releases 181 273 695 1,149
Average adjustments
per press release
1.5 1.1 2.0 1.7
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DEPRAMORT=Depreciation and amortization costs (excluding amortization of stock-based compensation); STOCKCOMP=Stock compensation costs;
MERGE=Merger and acquisition costs; R&D=Research and development (R&D) costs, and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D costs;
GAINLOSS=Gains and losses on sales of various assets; EXTRADISC=Extraordinary items and discontinued operations; SHARES=Alteration of the
number of shares outstanding used in calculating earnings per share (EPS); OTHER=All other adjustments.
SIC codes 1–1999=Mineral and construction industries; SIC codes 2000–2999=Manufacturing: food, tobacco, textile, lumber, furniture, paper, printing,
chemicals, and petroleum; SIC codes 3000–3999=Manufacturing: rubber, leather, stone, metal, machinery, electronic equipment, transportation equipment,
etc.; SIC codes 4000–4999=Transportation, communications, and utilities; SIC codes 5000–5999=Wholesale trade (durable and non-durable) and retail
trade (building materials, general merchandise, food, automotive, apparel); SIC codes 6000–6999=Financial services, insurance, and real estate industries;
SIC codes 7000–7999=Service Industries: hotels, personal services, business services, automotive repair, motion pictures, amusement and recreation services;
SIC codes 8000–8999=Service Industries: health, legal, educational, social, museums, engineering, accounting, management, etc.
aThe ‘‘Adjustment category’’ section of this panel only includes pro froma announcement that disclose adjustment details (qualitative or quantitative).
bEach pro forma press release contains one or more adjustments from GAAP income. In many cases, the number of adjustments is greater than one.
Therefore, the ‘‘Total adjustments’’ row for Panel B contains the number of adjustments made each year, while the ‘‘Total press releases’’ row contains the
number of press releases each year.
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Fig. 1 illustrates how the level of detail about adjustments has changed over time.
We ﬁnd three levels of disclosure among our sample ﬁrms. Most ﬁrms disclose both
the type and the magnitude of adjustments from GAAP earnings to arrive at the pro
forma ﬁgure, while some ﬁrms only reveal the adjustments made, but fail to disclose
the magnitude of the adjustments. Finally, some ﬁrms disclose neither. Fig. 1 shows
that in 1998, 59% of pro forma press releases disclosed both the classiﬁcation and
the magnitude of the adjustment. The percentage of press releases with full details
about amount and classiﬁcation of adjustments increased to 68% in 1999, and ﬁnally
to 74% in 2000. Conversely, the announcements with no information about speciﬁc
adjustments decreased from 18% in 1998 to 6% in 2000. This suggests that vague
and potentially misleading pro forma reports have decreased over time. Since the
SEC has expressed particular concern about ambiguous and misleading pro forma
adjustments and exclusions, this trend is encouraging.
While Table 1 presents evidence that pro forma reporting has become more
prevalent in recent years, we ﬁnd that individual ﬁrms tend to report pro forma
numbers fairly infrequently. The 1,149 press releases in our sample were made by 596
ﬁrms. Thus, on average, a ﬁrm made less than two (1.93) quarterly pro forma
earnings announcements during the entire three-year sample period. Fig. 2 reports
the frequency with which ﬁrms reported quarterly pro forma press releases during
our sample period. The majority of the sample ﬁrms (314 out of 596, or
approximately 53%) reported pro forma earnings only once during the entire
sample period. Only about 23% (139 out of 596) of our sample ﬁrms reported pro
forma numbers two times during this three-year period.11
It is possible that some of these ﬁrms may have reported earnings on a pro forma
basis prior to 1998 or after 2000. Furthermore, it is possible that some of these ﬁrms
may have reported a non-GAAP EPS metric using a nomenclature other than ‘‘pro
forma’’, ‘‘pro-forma’’, or ‘‘proforma’’ during our sample period. Therefore, we
examine a random sample of 100 of the 314 ﬁrms that report on a pro forma basis
only once during our sample period in order to assess (1) to what extent managers
use other nomenclatures in press releases and (2) the likelihood that sample ﬁrms
report on a pro forma basis outside our sample window. We examine these ﬁrms’
quarter q  1 and quarter q þ 1 earnings announcements relative to the pro forma
announcement quarter identiﬁed by our initial LexisNexis search (quarter q). In
quarter q  1; we ﬁnd that 4% announce pro forma earnings (but quarter q  1
occurs prior to our sample period in 1997), 38% report only GAAP EPS ﬁgures,
38% report a non-GAAP EPS ﬁgure using a different nomenclature, 11% do not
have a public earnings press release because their IPO occurs in quarter q; and ﬁnally
for the remaining 9%, we cannot ﬁnd a quarter q  1 press release on LexisNexis.
Quarter q þ 1 analysis reveals that 19% report pro forma earnings (but quarter q þ 1
occurs in 2001), 49% report only GAAP EPS ﬁgures, 27% report a non-GAAP EPS
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11Additional analysis (not reported in Fig. 2) reveals that only 11% of the ﬁrms reported pro forma
press releases four or more times during our sample period, and very few of these reports occurred in
consecutive quarters. Our sample includes only 34 ﬁrms that reported pro forma numbers in four or more
consecutive quarters.
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metric using a different nomenclature, and we cannot ﬁnd a quarter q þ 1 press
release for the remaining 5%. These results suggest that our search string captures
approximately half of all possible non-GAAP EPS ﬁgures announced by sample
ﬁrms during this period. This proportion is consistent with our search (reported
earlier in the paper) for other non-GAAP EPS ﬁgures during the June–August 2000
sub-period.
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Fig. 1. Evidence on the level of detail disclosed in pro forma press releases each year during the sample
period (1998–2000).
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Fig. 2. Frequency of pro forma reporting during the sample period. This chart classiﬁes sample ﬁrms
based on the number of times they report quarterly EPS on a pro forma basis from 1998 to 2000.
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3.3. Descriptive statistics and comparisons of pro forma, GAAP, and I/B/E/S earnings
metrics
We examine three measures of operating earnings: (1) GAAP diluted operating
EPS using Compustat data, EPSGAAP,
12 (2) actual EPS from the I/B/E/S database,
EPSIBES,
13 and (3) pro forma diluted EPS announced in actual press releases,
EPSPROFORMA. Panel A of Table 2 shows that while the mean GAAP operating EPS
ﬁgure is signiﬁcantly negative ($0.147) for our sample ﬁrms, the mean I/B/E/S and
pro forma EPS numbers are both positive ($0.047 and $0.085, respectively).14 This
suggests that GAAP operating income is generally more conservative than both pro
forma and I/B/E/S earnings values.
We also calculate three measures of forecast error or earnings surprise: (1)
FEGAAP is calculated by subtracting the mean analysts’ forecast from GAAP diluted
operating EPS and scaling this difference by the closing price ﬁve days before the
earnings announcement, day t  5; (Christie, 1987), (2) FEIBES is calculated by
subtracting the mean analysts’ forecast from EPSIBES and scaling this difference by
closing price on day t 5; and (3) FEPROFORMA is calculated by subtracting the
mean forecast from EPSPROFORMA and scaling the difference by closing price on day
t  5: The mean forecast is calculated for each ﬁrm using all forecasts from the
I/B/E/S detail ﬁle made within 90 days prior to the quarterly earnings announcement
date. The 90-day restriction ensures that forecasts are current. We also repeat all
analyses using the median forecast, and the results are qualitatively similar. We ﬁnd
from Panel A of Table 2 that (1) both the mean and the median measures of FEGAAP
are negative, while the means and medians of the other two forecast error variables
are not, suggesting again that EPSGAAP is likely the most conservative earnings
metric, and (2) GAAP operating earnings generally fall short of analysts’
expectations in our sample.
We use market value of common equity (in millions) ﬁve days prior to the earnings
announcement date as a measure of ﬁrm size (MKTVALUE). Panel A of Table 2
reveals that a few ﬁrms in our sample are much larger than most of the sample ﬁrms
because the mean MKTVALUE ($6,246 million) is substantially higher than even
the 75th percentile of the distribution ($2,589 million).15 The average size of our
ﬁrms is also larger than the mean of active ﬁrms on Compustat ($2,258 million).
We next examine the differences between the earnings metrics. Panel B of Table 2
reports the distributions of the pair-wise differences between the earnings metrics.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
12We begin with GAAP basic earnings per share from operations (Compustat quarterly data item 177)
and multiply this by the number of basic shares outstanding (Compustat quarterly data item 15) to get
total operating earnings. We then divide operating earnings by the number of diluted shares outstanding
(Compustat annual data item 171) to obtain diluted operating earnings per share.
13The I/B/E/S manual states that the actual earnings ﬁgures reported by I/B/E/S are usually operating
earnings as opposed to net income.
14Additional analysis suggests that the mean EPSGAAP for the Compustat population is also positive,
$0.164.
15We ﬁnd similar distributional properties (not tabulated) for total assets and net sales of our sample
ﬁrms.
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For each announcement, we calculate the pair-wise differences between
EPSPROFORMA and EPSGAAP, EPSPROFORMA and EPSIBES, and EPSIBES and
EPSGAAP. Panel B of Table 2 reports the distributions of these pair-wise differences
and indicates that pro forma earnings are substantially higher than GAAP operating
earnings (on average, about 23 cents per share higher). The t-statistic and two-tailed
probability from this pair-wise comparison (reported in Panel C of this table) show
that the difference between pro forma and GAAP earnings is highly signiﬁcant
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics based on 1,149 pro forma press releases of 596 ﬁrms (1998–2000)
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of key variables
Variable 25th Percentile Mean Median 75th Percentile
MKTVALUE 277.834 6,246.384 752.374 2,588.578
EPSGAAP 0.350 0.147 0.010 0.200
EPSIBES 0.120 0.047 0.060 0.200
EPSPROFORMA 0.120 0.085 0.080 0.220
FEGAAP
a 0.012 0.017 0.002 0.001
FEIBES 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
FEPROFORMA 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003
Panel B: Distribution of differences between earnings metrics
Variable 25th Percentile Mean Median 75th Percentile
EPSPROFORMAEPSGAAP 0.000 0.232 0.050 0.190
EPSPROFORMAEPSIBES 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.010
EPSIBESEPSGAAP 0.010 0.194 0.020 0.170
Panel C: Univariate comparisons of earnings metrics
Null hypothesis T-statistic P-value
Ho:EPSPROFORMA=EPSGAAP 10.36 0.0001
Ho:EPSPROFORMA=EPSIBES 4.99 0.0001
Ho:EPSIBES=EPSGAAP 8.83 0.0001
MKTVALUE=Market value of common equity in $millions ﬁve days prior to the pro forma
announcement date; EPSGAAP=Compust dilute operating earnings per share; FEIBES=I/B/E/S actual
earnings per share; EPSPROFORMA=Pro forma earnings per share; FEGAAP=Forecast error calculated as
Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t5;
FEIBES=Forecast error calculated as IBES actual EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price
on day t5; FEPROFORMA=Forecast error calculated as pro forma EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast,
scaled by price on day t5.
aWe calculate forecast errors based on the GAAP, I/B/E/S, and pro forma earnings per share ﬁgures for
each ﬁrm as the respective EPS metric minus the mean analysts’ EPS forecast. The mean forecast is
calculated for each ﬁrm using all forecasts from the I/B/E/S detail ﬁle made within 90 days prior to the
quarterly earnings announcement date.
N. Bhattacharya et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 36 (2003) 285–319 299
(po0:0001). We also ﬁnd that the mean difference between EPSPROFORMA and
EPSIBES of approximately 4 cents is highly statistically signiﬁcant (po0:0001). This
suggests that even for the small subset of all ﬁrms covered by major forecast tracking
services that report pro forma earnings, there is a signiﬁcant difference between pro
forma and I/B/E/S EPS ﬁgures. As a result, we conclude that using the latter as a
proxy for the former may be problematic. Finally, we ﬁnd that EPSIBES is also
signiﬁcantly greater (po0:0001) than EPSGAAP.
Fig. 3 further illustrates the differences among these three earnings metrics.
Pro forma earnings are greater than GAAP operating earnings about 70% of the
time, while about 30% of pro forma numbers are less than GAAP earnings.16
Similarly, pro forma numbers are greater than I/B/E/S actual EPS values in more
than a quarter of our sample (26% of the time), while pro forma numbers are less
than I/B/E/S EPS values in less than a tenth of the press releases (9% of the
announcements). Pro forma earnings are equal to IBES actual EPS values in the
majority of the announcements (about 65% of the time). In summary, we ﬁnd that
pro forma numbers are signiﬁcantly greater than both GAAP operating earnings and
earnings values reported by I/B/E/S. This indicates that pro forma earnings generally
exclude expenses that should be recognized according to GAAP. Moreover, pro
forma earnings exclude more expenses than analysts generally exclude from their
forecasts.
Given the evidence that pro forma EPS ﬁgures exceed GAAP EPS numbers 70%
of the time, we investigate whether managers strategically highlight their preferred
earnings ﬁgure by reporting it ﬁrst in the press release.17 Fig. 4 presents descriptive
evidence on the frequency with which managers report pro forma and GAAP EPS
ﬁgures ﬁrst in the press release. Chart 1 of Fig. 4 reveals that while the pro forma
earnings ﬁgure exceeds the GAAP number 70% of the time, the pro forma ﬁgure is
reported ﬁrst 87% of the time. This indicates that managers generally report the pro
forma ﬁgure ﬁrst, even if the GAAP number is higher. Chart 2 of Fig. 4 further
explores this notion by illustrating the proportion of pro forma and GAAP earnings
ﬁgures that are reported ﬁrst given the relative magnitudes of the two numbers. The
results indicate that when the pro forma number is higher, it is generally reported
ﬁrst. However, we ﬁnd that in 25% of our sample press releases, the pro forma ﬁgure
is reported ﬁrst, even though the GAAP number is higher. This is consistent with the
notion that at least some managers may report pro forma ﬁgures because they
believe the pro forma ﬁgures better represent recurring earnings and not because
they desire to report a higher earnings number.
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16We examine the adjustments in announcements where the GAAP EPS ﬁgure exceeds the pro forma
EPS ﬁgure to determine whether there are systematic differences in the types of adjustments used by ﬁrms
with GAAP earnings that exceed pro forma earnings. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher GAAP earnings are
signiﬁcantly more likely to make adjustments for gains and losses on asset disposals (GAINLOSS) and less
likely to make adjustments for stock based compensation costs (STOCKCOMP), acquired in-process
research and development costs (R&D), and depreciation and amortization expenses (DEPRAMORT).
17Schrand and Walther (2000) ﬁnd evidence that managers strategically highlight prior period gains and
losses on asset disposals in order to portray current income in the most positive light possible.
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We also examine the frequencies with which these three earnings metrics (1) report
a proﬁt or (2) manage to meet or beat analysts’ expectations. Fig. 5 presents some
descriptive evidence. We ﬁnd that both pro forma and I/B/E/S earnings ﬁgures
report a proﬁt about 65% of the time, while only 52% of GAAP operating earnings
ﬁgures result in a proﬁt. Finally, an extremely high proportion (about 80%) of pro
forma announcements meet or exceed the mean analyst forecast, while only 39% of
GAAP operating earnings are equal to or above the mean analyst forecast. This
evidence is consistent with the notion that managers are often under extreme
pressure to meet analysts’ expectations (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Skinner
and Sloan, 2001), and pro forma reporting may often be motivated by managers’
desires to meet these targets. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) report additional descriptive
evidence about this sample.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Pro Forma versus GAAP
70%
0%
30% Pro Forma > GAAP
Pro Forma = GAAP
Pro Forma < GAAP
Pro Forma versus IBES
26%
65%
9%
Pro Forma > IBES
Pro Forma = IBES
Pro Forma < IBES
GAAP versus IBES
36%
1%
63%
GAAP > IBES
GAAP = IBES
GAAP < IBES
Fig. 3. Comparisons of operating earnings metrics.
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4. The informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings
4.1. The informativeness of pro forma earnings relative to I/B/E/S and GAAP earnings
4.1.1. Methodology for examining the relative informativeness of the earnings metrics
We ﬁrst examine whether pro forma earnings are relatively more informative than
I/B/E/S earnings ﬁgures or GAAP operating earnings. In order to investigate this
question, we regress short-window abnormal returns separately on earnings
surprise (forecast error) measures based on each of the three earnings metrics
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Fig. 4. Magnitude of earnings metrics and the order reported in press releases.
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(FEGAAP, FEPROFORMA and FEIBES):
CAR ¼a01 þ a1FEGAAP þ e1 ð1Þ
CAR ¼a02 þ a2FEPROFORMA þ e2 ð2Þ
CAR ¼a03 þ a3FEIBES þ e3 ð3Þ
where CAR is the cumulative size-adjusted abnormal returns over the three-day
window centered on the pro forma earnings announcement date.18 Size-adjusted
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Fig. 5. Comparisons of earnings metrics in meeting speciﬁc earnings targets.
18We ﬁnd qualitatively similar results using value-weighted market-adjusted abnormal returns.
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daily returns are calculated as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc daily return minus the average return
on that day of the size-decile portfolio to which the ﬁrm belongs.
The earnings response coefﬁcient (i.e., the mapping of earnings surprise into
prices) and the adjusted-R2 value (i.e., the overall explanatory power of the earnings
surprise measure) from each regression provide measures of the informativeness of
the respective earnings metrics (e.g., Brown et al., 1987; Brown and Sivakumar,
2003).19
We use Vuong’s (1989) likelihood ratio test (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Ayers, 1998;
Bhattacharya, 2001) and a test developed by Biddle et al. (1995) to compare the
relative explanatory power (adjusted-R2 values) of Models 1 and 2, and Models 2
and 3.20 Similarly, we estimate the following models with standardized variables (i.e.,
variables for which the distribution of each variable has been transformed so that the
mean is zero and the standard deviation is one) in order to directly compare the
respective earnings response coefﬁcients, a1 versus a2 and a2 versus a3:
21
CAR ¼a04 þ a1FEGAAP þ a2FEPROFORMA þ e4 ð4Þ
CAR ¼ a05 þ a2FEPROFORMA þ a3FEIBES þ e5 ð5Þ
After estimating the above models, we employ an F-test to examine the following
null hypotheses: a1 ¼ a2; and a2 ¼ a3: These models provide direct empirical
evidence about whether pro forma numbers are signiﬁcantly more informative than
GAAP operating earnings or I/B/E/S EPS ﬁgures.
4.1.2. Testing the informativeness of pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S
earnings
Table 3 presents results regarding the relative informativeness of pro forma,
GAAP, and I/B/E/S earnings ﬁgures. Panel A estimates Models 1–3 described above.
The results indicate that the coefﬁcient on FEGAAP (a1) is not statistically signiﬁcant,
while the coefﬁcients on both FEPROFORMA (a2) and FEIBES (a3) are signiﬁcantly
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19We winsorize each of the variables used in the regression models at the 1st and 99th percentiles to
reduce the inﬂuence of extreme observations on the results.
20 In examining two non-nested models, Vuong’s (1989) Z-statistic (from a likelihood ratio test) can be
used to determine the model with a better statistical ﬁt. Biddle et al. (1995) develop a Wald-type test that
examines whether one set of independent variables explains the variations in the dependent variable
signiﬁcantly better than another set of independent variables. Their test statistic is asymptotically valid
with a w2 distribution even when disturbances are heteroskedastic.
21 In a regular OLS estimation, examining the magnitudes of the estimated coefﬁcients does not allow
the researcher to conclude that the explanatory variable with the largest coefﬁcient has the greatest
explanatory power for the dependent variable because the magnitudes of the coefﬁcients are sensitive to
the units used to measure the respective variables. Standardization makes the scale of the regressors
irrelevant and therefore places the explanatory variables on ‘‘equal footing’’ in terms of explanatory
power. Therefore, the standardized coefﬁcients can be interpreted as the number of standard error changes
in the dependent variable resulting from a standard error change in the independent variable. Thus, the
coefﬁcients measure the effects of each variable in standard deviation units as opposed to the original units
of the explanatory variables. As a result, OLS estimation with standardized variables is a more desirable
technique when the primary objective is to measure the relative strengths of the regressors in explaining the
variations in the dependent variable (e.g., Kennedy, 1992; Wooldridge, 2000).
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Table 3
Relative informativeness of GAAP, IBES, and Pro forma earnings measures (N ¼ 1; 149)
Panel A:a Comparing the relative ﬁt of Models 1–3
Variable Coefﬁcient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept a0i 0.005 0.000 0.002
(1.19) (0.02) (0.60)
FEGAAP a1 0.111
FEPROFORMA a2 (1.27) 2.068
(5.48)
FEIBES a3 3.710
(6.94)
Adjusted-R2 0.10% 2.50% 4.00%
Comparing
Models 1
and 2
Comparing
Models 2
and 3
Vuong’s Z-statisticb 2.38 1.90
Biddle, Seow, and Siegel’s X 2-statisticc 3.53 2.94
Panel B:d Comparing the incremental informativeness of pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S earnings
Variable Coefﬁcient Model 4 Model 5
Intercept a0i 0.000 0.001
(0.01) (0.02)
FEGAAP a1 0.027
(0.91)
FEPROFORMA a2 0.162 0.051
(5.41) (1.30)
FEIBES a3 0.169
(4.41)
Adjusted-R2 2.50% 4.01%
F-Statistic: H0 : a1 ¼ a2 9.76

F-Statistic: H0 : a2 ¼ a3 2.80

Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
CAR=Cumulative size-adjusted abnormal returns over the three-day window surrounding pro forma
earnings announcements; FEGAAP=Forecast error relative to Compustat operating earnings per share,
scaled by price on day t5; FEPROFORMA=Forecast error relative to I/B/E/S actual earnings per share,
scaled by price on day t5; FEIBES=Forecast error relative to I/B/E/S actual earnings per share, scaled by
price on day t5.
aThis panel compares the relative explanatory power of forecast errors based on each earnings measure
for cumulative abnormal returns around the pro forma earnings announcement date.
bVuong’s (1989) likelihood ratio test compares two models in terms of ﬁt or explanatory power. A
signiﬁcant Z-statistic indicates that one model has signiﬁcantly better ﬁt than the other.
cBiddle et al. (1995) develop a Wald X 2 test to compare the relative explanatory power of two non-
nested models. A signiﬁcant X 2-statistic indicates that one model ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly better than the
other.
dThis panel reports results of regressions using standardized (mean 0 and standard deviation 1)
variables (Kennedy, 1992) to allow the direct comparison of coefﬁcients as an indication of the
informativeness of pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S earnings measures in explaining
variations in cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcement.
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positive.22 This panel also reports that Model 2 has signiﬁcantly more explanatory
power than Model 1 (since Vuong’s Z-statistic and Biddle, Seow, and Siegel’s w2
statistic are both signiﬁcant) suggesting that pro forma earnings are more
informative to investors than GAAP operating income. We also ﬁnd evidence
suggesting that I/B/E/S earnings (Model 3) has more explanatory power for
abnormal returns than pro forma earnings (Model 2) as evidenced by the fact that
Vuong’s Z-statistic and Biddle, Seow, and Siegel’s w2 statistic are signiﬁcant at the
10% level.23
Panel B of Table 3 reports results for Models 4 and 5. As explained above, these
models enable us to directly compare the coefﬁcient on FEPROFORMA (a2) with the
coefﬁcient on FEGAAP (a1) and the coefﬁcient on FEIBES (a3). Consistent with the
results from the previous panel, we ﬁnd that a2 is signiﬁcantly greater than a1
(po0:01) suggesting that pro forma earnings are more informative than GAAP
operating earnings. Finally, we ﬁnd limited evidence that a3 is greater than a2 (since
the F-statistic is signiﬁcant at the 10% level) consistent with the notion that I/B/E/S
EPS ﬁgures are more informative than actual pro forma earnings numbers.24
However, Philbrick and Ricks (1991) document that matching analysts’ forecasts to
actual earnings ﬁgures reported by the same tracking service provides a more
accurate (less noisy) measure of earnings surprise. Therefore, by design, FEIBES is
less noisy than the other two forecast error measures since the earnings expectation
and EPSIBES include or exclude the same items, while the other two earnings metrics
may not make the exact same adjustments. Given this ‘‘errors in variables’’ problem,
it is difﬁcult to draw inference regarding the relative informativeness of I/B/E/S
earnings ﬁgure vis-"a-vis the other two earnings metrics.
In order to assess the sensitivity of our results to this ‘‘errors in variables’’
problem, we replicate our information content analyses using a random-walk
earnings expectation instead of the I/B/E/S analysts’ mean forecast as our expected
earnings measure. In other words, we now deﬁne our forecast errors as the three
respective actual EPS ﬁgures (GAAP, pro forma, and I/B/E/S) minus GAAP
operating EPS from quarter q  4: We, therefore, induce a bias in favor of ﬁnding
signiﬁcance for the GAAP EPS ﬁgure. The results are qualitatively similar. The
coefﬁcient on the GAAP forecast error in Model 1 is not signiﬁcant, while the
coefﬁcient on the pro forma forecast error in Model 2 is still signiﬁcantly positive
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22The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on FEGAAP is not surprising given the unique nature of the ﬁrms that self-
select into our sample. As explained in Section 3.2, these ﬁrms are highly concentrated in the service and
high-tech sectors. Moreover, evidence reported in Table 2 indicates that our sample of voluntary pro
forma announcers, on average, report losses. Hayn (1995) ﬁnds that the association between unexpected
earnings and abnormal returns is signiﬁcantly higher for proﬁt ﬁrms relative to loss ﬁrms. Moreover, our
sample size is relatively small compared to studies that examine the entire population of Compustat/CRSP
ﬁrms (e.g., Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002).
23Vuong and Biddle et al. tests comparing Models 1 and 3 (not tabulated) suggest that FEIBES also has
signiﬁcantly more explanatory power for abnormal returns than FEGAAP.
24When we estimate an additional standardized model regressing CAR on FEGAAP and FEIBES, the
results indicate that the coefﬁcient on FEIBES is signiﬁcantly greater than the coefﬁcient on FEGAAP
(po0:01).
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(t-statistic=1.74, two-tailed p-value=0.082). Interestingly, the coefﬁcient on the
I/B/E/S forecast error is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. The Biddle et al. (1995) w2
statistic comparing the explanatory power of Models 1 and 2 is also signiﬁcant
suggesting that the pro forma forecast error has greater explanatory power for
abnormal returns than the GAAP forecast error. These results suggest that pro
forma EPS is more informative than GAAP operating EPS even when forecast errors
are biased in favor of the GAAP EPS ﬁgure.
Given the evidence previously reported that managers may report GAAP or pro
forma EPS ﬁgures ﬁrst in the press release to highlight their preferred earnings
measure, we repeat our Table 3 regressions on the subset of earnings announcements
where the pro forma EPS ﬁgure is reported ﬁrst (997 observations) in order to assess
whether the results are different from the full sample results. Replication of our
results on this subsample yields identical results. When we repeat Table 3 analyses on
the subset of observations where the GAAP EPS number is reported ﬁrst, we ﬁnd
qualitatively similar but weaker results. This is likely due to low statistical power
since this sub-sample contains only 152 observations.
4.2. The permanence of pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S earnings
4.2.1. Methodology for examining the relative permanence of the earnings metrics
We next examine whether pro forma earnings are more permanent (i.e., are
perceived to be closer to ‘‘core earnings’’ that are likely to continue in the future
periods) than GAAP or I/B/E/S earnings. In order to investigate this question, we
regress the revision in analysts’ one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts on forecast
errors based on the three earnings metrics. Prior research (e.g., Easton and
Zmijewski, 1989; Collins and DeAngelo, 1990; Johnson, 1999) has measured
earnings persistence as the extent to which the mean analysts’ forecast is revised in
response to an earnings announcement. The rationale behind this approach is that an
earnings innovation that is perceived to be more permanent in nature induces
analysts to revise their expectations about future earnings more than an earnings
innovation perceived to be less permanent in nature. We therefore, estimate the
following models:
REVISION ¼ b01 þ b1FEGAAP þ e1 ð6Þ
REVISION ¼ b02 þ b2FEPROFORMA þ e2 ð7Þ
REVISION ¼ b03 þ b3FEIBES þ e3 ð8Þ
where REVISION is the revision in one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts based on
information in the current quarterly earnings announcement. We ﬁrst calculate the
mean forecast using all quarter q þ 1 forecasts made within the 60-day post-
announcement window beginning on the quarter q earnings announcement date. We
then subtract the mean forecast based on all quarter q þ 1 forecasts made within a
60-day window immediately prior to the quarter q earnings announcement date.
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Table 4
Relative persistence of GAAP, IBES, and pro forma earnings measures (based on 796 pro forma press
releases of 596 ﬁrms during the years 1998–2000)
Panel A:a Comparing the relative ﬁt of Models 1–3
Variable Coefﬁcient Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept b0i 0.001 0.0001 0.001
(4.52) (7.00) (6.64)
FEGAAP b1 0.003
(0.80)
FEPROFORMA b2 0.201
(11.41)
FEIBES b3 0.429
(19.09)
Adjusted-R2 0.10% 14.10% 31.50%
Comparing
Models 6
and 7
Comparing
Models 7
and 8
Vuong’s Z-statisticb 2.16 2.98
Biddle, Seow, and
Siegel’s X 2-statisticc
4.76 3.58
Panel B:d Comparing the incremental persistence of pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S
earnings
Variable Coefﬁcient Model 9 Model 10
Intercept b0i 0.005 0.001
(0.14) (0.04)
FEGAAP b1 0.011
(0.34)
FEPROFORMA b2 0.433 0.058
(11.38) (1.35)
FEIBES b3 0.060
(14.25)
Adjusted-R2 14.00% 31.60%
F-Statistic: H0 : b1 ¼ b2 70.95

F-Statistic: H0 : b2 ¼ b3 50.38

Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
REVISION=The revision in the mean one-quarter-ahead analyst forecast using a 60-day window around
the current pro forma earnings announcement date, scaled by stock price ﬁve days prior to the
announcement; FEGAAP=Forecast error relative to Compustat operating earnings per share, scaled by
price on day t5; FEPROFORMA=Forecast error relative to I/B/E/S actual earnings per share, scaled by
price on day t5; FEIES=Forecast error relative to I/B/E/S actual earnings per share, scaled by price on
day t5.
aThis panel compares the relative explanatory power of forecast errors based on each earnings measure
for revisions in analysts’ one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts.
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Finally, we scale the forecast revision by the closing stock price ﬁve days before the
quarter q earnings announcement date.25
The coefﬁcient on the earnings surprise or forecast error (b1 or b2 or b3) as well as
the adjusted-R2 value from each regression provide evidence regarding the
permanence or persistence of the respective earnings metrics.26 We again employ
Vuong’s (1989) test and the Biddle et al. (1995) test to compare the relative
explanatory power (based on the adjusted-R2 values) of Models 6–8. Finally, we
estimate the following standardized regressions to directly compare the coefﬁcients:
b1 versus b2 and b2 versus b3
REVISION ¼ b04 þ b1FEGAAP þ b2FEPROFORMA þ e4; ð9Þ
REVISION ¼b05 þ b2FEPROFORMA þ b3FEIBES þ e5: ð10Þ
4.2.2. Testing the permanence of pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S
earnings
Table 4 reports results of tests examining the persistence of the three earnings
measures.27 Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the coefﬁcient on FEGAAP, b1; is not
signiﬁcant, while the coefﬁcients on both FEPROFORMA (b2) and FEIBES (b3) are
signiﬁcantly positive. Comparisons of Models 6 and 7 suggest that pro forma
numbers have signiﬁcantly greater explanatory power for revisions in analysts’ one-
quarter-ahead earnings forecasts than GAAP operating earnings (since both
Vuong’s Z-statistic and Biddle, Seow, and Siegel w2 statistic are signiﬁcant in the
comparison of Models 6 and 7). Similar to the results presented in Table 3, we ﬁnd
that the forecast error based on I/B/E/S earnings has signiﬁcantly greater
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bVuong’s (1989) likelihood ratio test compares two models in terms of ﬁt or explanatory power. A
signiﬁcant Z-statistic indicates that one model has signiﬁcantly better ﬁt than the other.
cBiddle et al. (1995) develop a Wald X 2 test to compare the relative explanatory power of two non-
nested models. A signiﬁcant X 2-statistic indicates that one model ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly better than the
other.
dThis panel reports results of regressions using standardized (mean 0 and standard deviation 1)
variables (Kennedy, 1992) to allow the direct comparison of coefﬁcients as an indication of the
informativeness of pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S earnings measures in explaining
variations in cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates.
Table 4 (continued)
25When we perform sensitivity analyses using 45-day pre- and post-earnings-announcement windows
and also using the revision in two-quarter-ahead forecasts (instead of one-quarter-ahead forecasts) the
results are qualitatively similar.
26Another method for assessing earnings persistence is to employ a pure time-series design (e.g.,
Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). However, as explained in Section 3.2 and
Footnote 11, very few of our sample ﬁrms reported pro forma numbers multiple times during our three-
year sample period. This highlights the difﬁculty of performing formal time-series analysis in our sample.
27All regressions that examine the permanence of our earnings metrics (presented in Tables 4 and 6) are
limited to 796 observations due to limited data for the REVISION variable on the I/B/E/S database.
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explanatory power for forecast revisions than the forecast error based on pro forma
earnings.
Although we ﬁnd evidence that EPS ﬁgures reported by I/B/E/S are more
permanent than both pro forma and GAAP earnings, we believe it is problematic to
assess the relative permanence of I/B/E/S EPS values vis-"a-vis pro forma and GAAP
earnings ﬁgures, given that the ‘‘errors in variables’’ problem mentioned in Section
4.1.2 applies here as well. Panel B of Table 4 reports standardized regression results
for pairs of forecast errors. Model 9 results suggest that the coefﬁcient on
FEPROFORMA (b2) is signiﬁcantly greater than the coefﬁcient on FEGAAP (b1). Model
10 results indicate that the coefﬁcient on FEIBES (b3) is signiﬁcantly greater than the
coefﬁcient on FEPROFORMA (b2). In sum, the results reported in this table
corroborate the results presented in Table 3. Overall, this body of evidence suggests
that market participants view pro forma earnings to be signiﬁcantly more
informative and a more permanent measure of future proﬁtability than GAAP
operating income.
We repeat our Table 4 analyses after partitioning our sample into two sub-samples
based on which earnings metric (GAAP or pro forma) is announced ﬁrst in the press
release. When we replicate our Table 4 analyses on the subset of announcements
where the pro forma ﬁgure is reported ﬁrst, we obtain qualitatively similar results.
When we repeat our Table 4 analyses on the announcements where the GAAP
number is reported ﬁrst, we get similar results except for Model 10 (where the pro
forma and I/B/E/S forecast errors are included simultaneously in the regression).
Model 10 results indicate that for the GAAP-ﬁrst sub-sample, the coefﬁcient on the
pro forma forecast error is signiﬁcantly positive while the coefﬁcient on the I/B/E/S
forecast error is insigniﬁcant.
4.3. Benchmarking the results with other pro forma studies
We next examine how our results compare with those of other studies that use
actual pro forma press releases. Two recent working papers by Lougee and
Marquardt (2002; hereafter LM) and (Johnson and Schwartz (2001); hereafter JS)
analyze actual pro forma press releases. LM ﬁnd weak evidence that pro forma
earnings have incremental information content relative to GAAP earnings in their
full sample. However, they also ﬁnd stronger evidence that in certain circumstances
(when GAAP earnings quality is low and when the ﬁrm avoids reporting a loss or a
negative earnings surprise), pro forma income is signiﬁcantly more informative than
GAAP earnings. Thus, the results reported in the LM working paper are generally
consistent with ours. However, the JS study does not ﬁnd pro forma earnings to be
incrementally more informative relative to GAAP earnings. We therefore investigate
the observed differences between our results and those reported in the JS study.
One important difference between our study and the JS study is the difference in
sample size. To investigate whether the difference in inferences could be at least
partially attributable to sample size, we repeat our Table 3 analyses after limiting our
sample to the period examined by JS. Although their full sample includes 433 pro
forma announcements published in the three months between June and August 2000,
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their analysis concerning the informativeness of pro forma earnings involves only
253 observations (according to the December 2001 version of the JS paper).
Restricting our sample to the JS sample period results in a sub-sample of 189 pro
forma earnings reports.28 When we re-estimate our Models 1–5 on this sub-sample,
we no longer ﬁnd that pro forma income is signiﬁcantly more informative than
GAAP operating earnings. The adjusted-R2 values of the models also decrease. This
suggests that the reduced sample may lack statistical power to detect the effects
observed in our full sample (which is more than six times larger than this sub-
sample).
In order to further investigate the role of sample size in explaining the observed
differences between our results and those reported in the JS study, we replicate the JS
information content methodology on our full sample. In contrast to the inference
reached by JS, we ﬁnd evidence that investors perceive pro forma earnings to be
informative.29 In sum, the strong result in our full sample (that pro forma earnings
ﬁgures are signiﬁcantly more informative than GAAP earnings numbers) disappears
when we limit our analysis to the period examined by JS. Further, when we replicate
the JS information content methodology on our full sample, we ﬁnd results
consistent with our evidence that pro forma earnings are informative to investors.
These results suggest that the observed differences between our results and those
reported in the JS study are likely to be at least partially attributable to the difference
in sample size. We however, recognize that our analyses do not completely reconcile
our results with those reported in the JS study because (1) we do not replicate all of
their tests, (2) we search for pro forma press releases using a different database, and
(3) we use a different search string in identifying pro forma earnings reports.
Consequently, the difference in sample size is likely to be only one of many factors
contributing to the differences in inferences.
5. Factors associated with the informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings
5.1. Factors associated with the informativeness of pro forma earnings
We now investigate factors that could inﬂuence market participants’ reliance on
pro forma earnings information. Schrand and Walther (2000) report evidence of
opportunistic disclosures by managers attempting to paint the most favorable
picture of their companies. Critics of pro forma reporting speciﬁcally argue that
managers’ decision to disclose pro forma ﬁgures are often motivated by incentives to
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28There are two likely reasons why we have fewer usable pro forma press releases in this sub-period.
First, JS search Dow Jones Interactive, while we search LexisNexis. Second, we use a more restrictive
search string that focuses solely on the announcements that use a variant of the term ‘pro forma’.
29Speciﬁcally, we replicate the analysis reported in Table 6 of the JS (2001) working paper using our full
sample. In contrast to JS, we ﬁnd that the pro forma incremental intercept term is signiﬁcantly negative,
and the pro forma loss intercept term is signiﬁcantly positive. Thus, the results based on our larger sample,
which examines pro forma releases over a three-year period as opposed to a single quarter, suggest that
investors ﬁnd pro forma earnings to be informative.
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report a proﬁt or to meet analysts’ expectations (e.g., Elstein, 2001; Dow Jones,
2001b). Consequently, we investigate scenarios where strategic disclosure is
likely to occur. Our evidence is consistent with the allegations of opportunistic pro
forma reporting. As previously mentioned, Fig. 5 reports that the percentage
of pro forma announcements reporting a proﬁt (65.5%) is higher than the
proportion reporting positive GAAP operating earnings (52.0%). Similarly, Fig. 5
indicates a vast difference between the proportion of pro forma earnings ﬁgures
that meet or exceed analysts’ mean forecasts (80.1%) and the percentage of
GAAP operating earnings numbers that meet or beat analysts’ expectations (only
38.7%). Therefore, we examine whether investors ﬁnd earnings announcements that
report a pro forma proﬁt corresponding to a GAAP loss to be less informative.
Similarly, we investigate whether investors ﬁnd pro forma earnings announcements
meeting or exceeding analysts’ expectations while the corresponding GAAP
operating income ﬁgure falls short of analysts’ mean forecasts to be less informative.
In order to do so, we deﬁne two new variables: PROFIT, an indicator variable coded
one if EPSGAAP is negative while EPSPROFORMA is greater than or equal to zero and
CONSENSUS, an indicator variable coded one if FEGAAP is negative while
FEPROFORMA is greater than or equal to zero. We then regress cumulative size-
adjusted abnormal returns (CAR) on FEPROFORMA, and three interaction terms
between FEPROFORMA and (1) MKTVALUE to control for size effects,
30 (2)
PROFIT, and (3) CONSENSUS.
Accordingly, Table 5’s Model 1 examines whether managers’ implied incentives
for pro forma reporting affect the extent to which investors ﬁnd pro forma earnings
to be informative. Consistent with Table 3 results, the coefﬁcient on FEPROFORMA is
signiﬁcantly positive. However, the coefﬁcient on the PROFITFEPROFORMA
interaction term is also marginally signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) suggesting that
investors ﬁnd pro forma announcements that report a proﬁt while the corresponding
GAAP operating earnings report a loss to be incrementally more informative. The
coefﬁcient on the CONSENSUSFEPROFORMA interaction term is signiﬁcantly
negative (po0:05). This suggests that investors are skeptical of (or attach less weight
to) pro forma announcements that meet or exceed analysts’ expectations, while the
corresponding GAAP earnings ﬁgure does not. These results suggest that investors
are somewhat sensitive to managers’ perceived motivations for reporting non-
standard earnings metrics.
Next, we examine whether particular types of pro forma adjustments render pro
forma earnings more informative to investors. In order to do so, we deﬁne new
indicator variables for each of the eight categories of adjustments: (1) depreciation
and amortization, DEPRAMORT, (2) stock-based compensation costs, STOCK-
COMP, (3) merger and acquisition costs, MERGE, (4) in-process research and
development costs, R&D, (5) gains or losses on asset disposals, GAINLOSS, (6)
extraordinary items and discontinued operations, EXTRADISC, (7) the number of
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ﬁrms’ information environments (e.g., Atiase, 1985; Shores, 1990). Firm size is also likely related to ﬁrm
proﬁtability.
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Table 5
Factors affecting the informativeness of pro forma earnings (based on 1,149 pro forma press releases of
596 ﬁrms during the years 1998–2000)
Variable Coefﬁcient Model 1 Model 2
Parameter estimate
(T-statistic)
Parameter estimate
(T-statistic)
Intercept g0i 0.003 0.003
(0.061) (0.061)
FEPROFORMA g1 2.752 1.591
(4.86) (1.72)
MKTVALUEFEPROFORMA g2 0.037 0.027
(1.35) (0.93)
PROFITFEPROFORMA g3 1.777 0.644
(1.69) (0.56)
CONSENSUSFEPROFORMA g4 1.775 1.203
(2.12) (1.37)
DEPRAMORTFEPROFORMA g5 0.766
(1.32)
STOCKCOMPFEPROFORMA g6 0.874
(1.45)
MERGEFEPROFORMA g7 0.155
(0.78)
R&DFEPROFORMA g8 2.047
(2.18)
GAINLOSSFEPROFORMA g9 3.345
(2.08)
EXTRADISCFEPROFORMA g10 4.446
(2.34)
SHARESFEPROFORMA g11 0.105
(0.45)
OTHERFEPROFORMA g12 0.970
(1.08)
NOADJUSTFEPROFORMA g13 0.463
(0.32)
Adjusted-R2 2.80% 3.90%
Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
CAR=Cumulative abnormal returns over the three-day window centered on the pro forma earnings
announcement date relative to the ﬁrms’s size-decile portfolio; FEPROFORMA=Forecast error calculated as
pro forma EPS minus IBES mean forecast, scaled by price on day t–5; MKTVALUE=Market value of
common equity ﬁve days prior to the pro forma announcement; PROFIT=Indicator variable coded 1 if
the GAAP (Compustat) EPS is a loss, while the pro forma EPS is a proﬁt; 0 otherwise;
CONSENSUS=Indicator variable coded 1 if the GAAP EPS ﬁgure fails to meet mean analyst’ forecasts,
while the pro forma EPS ﬁgure meets or exceeds mean analysts’ forecasts; 0 otherwise; DEPRAMORT
=Indicator variable for depreciation and amortization costs (excluding amortization of stock-based
compensation); STOCKCOMP=Indicator variable for stock compensation costs; MERGE=Indicator
variable for merger and acquisition costs; R&D=Indicator variable for research and development (R&D)
costs and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D costs; GAINLOSS=Indicator variable for gains and
losses on sales of various assets; EXTRADISC=Indicator variable for extraordinary items and
discontinued operations; SHARES=Indicator variable for changes in the number of shares outstanding
used in EPS; OTHER=Indicator variable for all other adjustments; NOADJUST=Indicator variable if
no information is given in the press release about which adjustments are made.
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shares used in the denominator of the EPS calculation, SHARES, and (8) other
adjustments, OTHER.31 We then interact FEPROFORMA with each of these new
indicator variables and add these interaction terms to those used in Model 1. The
results from estimating this model (Model 2 in Table 5) reveal that pro forma
earnings are incrementally informative when the ﬁrm adjusts earnings for in-process
research and development costs (R&D), gains and losses related to asset disposals
(GAINLOSS), and ‘‘below the line’’ items (EXTRADISC). This suggests that
investors ﬁnd pro forma numbers more value relevant if the adjustments are one-
time exclusions as opposed to routine expenses (namely, depreciation and
amortization).32 However, we ﬁnd that after controlling for adjustment type, we
no longer ﬁnd signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the two manager incentive variables,
PROFIT and CONSENSUS.
5.2. Factors associated with the persistence of pro forma announcements
We next explore whether similar factors affect the persistence of pro forma
earnings. In order to do so, we re-estimate Models 1 and 2 described in Table 5
after replacing CAR with REVISION as the dependent variable. Consistent
with our Table 4 results, Model 1 of Table 6 indicates that FEPROFORMA is
signiﬁcantly positive. The PROFITFEPROFORMA interaction term is signiﬁcantly
negative (po0:01) suggesting that analysts attach less weight to the pro forma
earnings surprise in assessing the permanence of the earnings innovation when pro
forma adjustments convert a GAAP operating loss to a pro forma proﬁt. This
evidence is interesting because it suggests that analysts are more skeptical than the
average investor in situations where managers transform a GAAP loss into a pro
forma proﬁt (since the interaction term between PROFIT and FEPROFORMA is
signiﬁcantly positive in Table 5’s Model 1). The CONSENSUSFEPROFORMA
interaction term is, however, insigniﬁcant, consistent with the notion that analysts do
not discount pro forma announcements for which the pro forma numbers meet
analysts’ expectations, while the GAAP operating EPS ﬁgure falls short of the
target.
Results for Model 2 of Table 6 are consistent with the results for Model 1.
Moreover, the GAINLOSSFEPROFORMA interaction term is signiﬁcantly positive
similar to the results reported in Table 5’s Model 2. However, the interaction
terms between FEPROFORMA and (1) R&D and (2) EXTRADISC are not signi-
ﬁcant as they were in Table 5. Finally, the SHARESFEPROFORMA interaction
term is signiﬁcantly negative suggesting that analysts discount pro forma earnings
ﬁgures when managers appear to manipulate the pro forma ﬁgure by simply
changing the number of shares used in the denominator of the EPS calculation.
Once again, analysts appear to be more skeptical than investors. Overall, the results
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adjustment from GAAP earnings to arrive at pro forma earnings.
32We also repeated these analyses after including indicator variables to control for year and industry
effects. The inferences are unaffected by these additional controls.
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Table 6
Factors affecting the permanence of pro forma earnings (based on 796 pro forma press releases of 596
ﬁrms during the years 1998–2000)
Variable Coefﬁcient Model 1 Model 2
Parameter estimate
(T-statistic)
Parameter estimate
(T-statistic)
Intercept l0i 0.001 0.001
(5.65) (5.69)
FEPROFORMA l1 0.309 0.256
(11.99) (6.36)
MKTVALUEFEPROFORMA l2 0.006 0.005
(5.21) (3.87)
PROFITFEPROFORMA l3 0.208 0.226
(3.64) (3.31)
CONSENSUSFEPROFORMA l4 0.030 0.022
(0.78) (0.54)
DEPRAMORTFEPROFORMA l5 0.015
(0.54)
STOCKCOMPFEPROFORMA l6 0.041
(1.38)
MERGEFEPROFORMA l7 0.043
(0.86)
R&DFEPROFORMA l8 0.063
(1.34)
GAINLOSSFEPROFORMA l9 0.204
(3.08)
EXTRADISCFEPROFORMA l10 0.013
(0.10)
SHARESFEPROFORMA l11 0.030
(2.30)
OTHERFEPROFORMA l12 0.046
(1.08)
NOADJUSTFEPROFORMA l13 0.107
(1.49)
Adjusted-R2 18.90% 20.50%
Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
REVISION=The revision in the mean one-quarter-ahead analyst forecast using a 60-day window around
the current pro forma earnings announcement date, scaled by stock price ﬁve days prior to the
announcement; FEPROFORMA=Forecast error calculated as pro forma EPS minus IBES mean forecast,
scaled by price on day t–5; MKTVALUE=Market value of common equity ﬁve days prior to the pro
forma announcement; PROFIT=Indicator variable coded 1 if the GAAP (Compustat) EPS is a loss, while
the pro forma EPS is a proﬁt; 0 otherwise; CONSENSUS=Indicator variable coded 1 if the GAAP EPS
ﬁgure fails to meet mean analysts’ forecasts, while the pro forma EPS ﬁgure meets or exceeds mean
analysts’ forecasts; 0 otherwise; DEPRAMORT=Indicator variable for depreciation and amortization
costs (excluding amortization of stock-based compensation); STOCKCOMP=Indicator variable for stock
compensation costs; MERGE=Indicator variable for merger and acquisition costs; R&D=Indicator
variable for research and development (R&D) costs and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D costs;
GAINLOSS=Indicator variable for gains and losses on sales of various assets; EXTRADISC=Indicator
variable for extraordinary items and discontinued operations; SHARES=Indicator variable for changes
in the number of shares outstanding used in EPS; OTHER=Indicator variable for all other adjustments;
NOADJUST=Indicator variable if no information is given in the press release about which adjustments
are made.
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reveal some differences in the way investors and analysts interpret pro forma
information.33
6. Conclusion
This study examines the informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings
relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S operating income measures. Although most prior
studies have used I/B/E/S, First Call, or Zacks EPS ﬁgures as proxies for pro forma
earnings, we employ a large sample of hand-collected pro forma earnings numbers
gathered from actual press releases (1,149 pro forma announcements over a three-
year period). We also provide descriptive evidence regarding the characteristics of
ﬁrms that announce pro forma numbers and the common types of pro forma
adjustments and exclusions ﬁrms make to arrive at their pro forma numbers. We ﬁnd
that pro forma announcers are mostly concentrated in the service and high-tech
industries. Finally, we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant differences between each of our
earnings metrics: GAAP operating EPS, I/B/E/S actual EPS ﬁgures, and actual pro
forma EPS numbers.
Our investigation of short-window abnormal returns around earnings announce-
ment dates reveals that pro forma earnings are signiﬁcantly more informative than
GAAP operating earnings. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence based on one-quarter-ahead
revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts that pro forma earnings appear to be a more
permanent summary measure than GAAP operating earnings. Collectively, our
results suggest that market participants perceive pro forma earnings to be closer to
‘‘core earnings’’ than GAAP operating earnings. This is consistent with the view held
by supporters of pro forma reporting that pro forma numbers are cleaner and more
permanent measures of ﬁrm proﬁtability than GAAP earnings.
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33We also modify the PROFIT and CONSENSUS variables to see if the results are strengthened when
the observations are partitioned based on whether recurring expenses or one-time expenses are excluded in
changing a GAAP loss to a pro forma proﬁt or changing from a position of missing analysts’ expectation
to meeting or beating the target. The only category that can be unambiguously classiﬁed as a recurring
expense is the depreciation and amortization category (DEPRAMORT). Consequently, we modify the
PROFIT variable to be coded 1 if the ﬁrm reports a GAAP loss and a pro forma proﬁt and at least one of
the adjustments used to calculate the pro forma number is DEPRAMORT and 0 otherwise. Likewise, we
modify the CONSENSUS variable to be coded 1, if a ﬁrm reports a GAAP operating EPS ﬁgure below the
mean analysts’ forecast and a pro forma number at or above the mean forecast, and at least one of its
adjustments is DEPRAMORT and 0 otherwise. The notable changes between the results based on the
modiﬁed (and more restrictive) deﬁnitions of PROFIT and CONSENSUS, and the results reported in
Tables 5 and 6 are as follows. Investors appear to place more weight on pro forma earnings surprises when
GAAP losses are converted into pro forma proﬁts by adding back depreciation and amortization costs
(i.e., the PROFITFEPROFORMA interaction term is positive and highly signiﬁcant as opposed to being
marginally signiﬁcant in Model 1 of Table 5). Similarly, investors do not seem to be skeptical about
increases in earnings to reach the target analysts’ expectations by adding back depreciation and
amortization costs (i.e., the interaction term between CONSENSUS and FEPROFORMA is no longer
negatively signiﬁcant). In sum, it appears that investors are generally less skeptical about pro forma
announcements that achieve their targets (reporting proﬁt or meeting analysts’ expectation) by adding
back non-cash expenses such as depreciation and amortization.
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Our descriptive evidence further reveals that about 80% of ﬁrms announcing pro
forma earnings meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts, while only about 39% of these
same ﬁrms meet or beat analysts’ forecasts based on GAAP operating income
numbers. In addition, about 66% of pro forma announcements report a proﬁt while
only 52% of GAAP operating earnings ﬁgures result in a proﬁt. This prompts us to
investigate whether market participants ﬁnd pro forma releases less reliable when
GAAP losses have been converted to pro forma proﬁts or GAAP earnings below
analysts’ expectations have been transformed to pro forma numbers that meet or
exceed expectations. We ﬁnd evidence that investors do not discount pro forma
numbers that report a proﬁt while the corresponding GAAP earnings are losses.
However, the results indicate that investors attach less weight to announcements that
meet analysts’ expectations while the corresponding GAAP earnings fall short.
Analysts, on the other hand, appear to be skeptical about pro forma announcements
that transform a GAAP loss to a pro forma proﬁt and also about announcements
that only manipulate the number of shares used in the EPS calculation.
Our results are based on forecast errors calculated using the mean analysts’
forecast as an earnings expectation. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with
caution because I/B/E/S actual EPS ﬁgures generally exclude the same items that
analysts exclude from their forecasts. As a result, the I/B/E/S forecast error (by
construction) is the least noisy measure of earnings surprise, and both pro forma and
GAAP forecast errors are measured with noise. This creates a bias towards ﬁnding
I/B/E/S EPS numbers to be more informative than either GAAP operating EPS or
pro forma EPS ﬁgures. In order to assess how this bias affects our results, we repeat
our information content analyses using a seasonal random-walk earnings expecta-
tion (instead of analysts’ mean forecasts). This approach likely creates a bias in favor
of ﬁnding signiﬁcance for the GAAP EPS ﬁgure. However, we still ﬁnd that pro
forma EPS ﬁgures are signiﬁcantly more informative than GAAP operating EPS
numbers, suggesting that our inferences are not attributable to the bias created by
using I/B/E/S forecasts to compute an earnings expectation.
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